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基于双重委托代理问题的分析框架

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股权激励、代理成本与企业绩效——基于双重委托代理问题的分析框架被引量： Equity Incentive,Agency Costs and Corporate Performance——Based on the Analysis Framework of Double Principal-agent Problem

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摘要针对双重委托代理问题，本文构建了“股权激励-代理成本-企业绩效”的中介效应模型，将三者纳入了一个统一的分析框架，并运用2006—2013年中国A股上市公司的面板数据实证检验了股权激励对企业绩效、代理成本的影响，以及代理成本在股权激励与企业绩效关系中所起的中介作用。研究发现：股权激励能显著地提升企业绩效并能有效地抑制第一类代理成本，但对第二类代理问题的治理效应并不显著；第一类代理成本在股权激励与企业绩效之间起着部分中介作用，即股权激励是通过抑制第一类代理成本的作用路径间接地对企业绩效产生促进效应，而第二类代理成本的中介作用并未显现。 Based on the problem of double principal-agent,this paper constructs the mediating effect model of 'equity incentive,agency cost and corporate performance',puts the three into a uniform analysis framework and empirically tests the effects of equity incentive on corporate performance and agency cost and the mediating roles played by agency cost in equity incentive and corporate performance relationship by using the panel data of Chinese listed companies of A share from 2006 to 2013. Research finds: equity incentive can significantly raise corporate performance and efficiently inhibit the first type of agency cost but its harnessing effects on the second agency problem are not significant; The first agency cost plays partial mediating roles between equity incentive and corporate performance,that is,equity incentive indirectly generates promoting effects on corporate performance by the role route of the first type of agency cost but the mediating roles of the second agency cost are not significant.

作者陈文强贾生华 CHEN Wen-qiang;JIA Sheng-hua;School of Management,Zhejiang University;

机构地区浙江大学管理学院

出处《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第2期106-113,共8页 Modern Economic Science

关键词股权激励双重委托代理问题两类代理成本企业绩效中介作用 Equity Incentive Double Principal-agent Problem Two Types of Agency Cost Corporate Performance Mediating Role

分类号 F840.67 [经济管理—保险]

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基于双重委托代理问题的分析框架

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